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1. Introduction	  
	  
It is well known that lack of timely, appropriate ambulatory care may lead to complications that 
require hospitalization, creating unnecesary costs in economic and human terms. Wide international 
evidence show that better ambulatory care can decrease the need for hospitalization (Starfield, 1991, 
Fleming, 1995, Caminal et al, 2004, Macinko et al, 2010).  This is especially true in the case of 
Ambulatory care-sensitive conditions (ACSC), which are conditions that can be easily managed with 
timely and effective outpatient care (Rizza et al, 2007).   Rates of avoidable hospitalizations have been 
used as a tracer to assess access, quality and performance of the primary care delivery system (Bindman 
et al.1995, Ansari et al 2006).  Most of the research on ACSC has focused on [2-5] determining the 
socioeconomic and medical conditions associated with hospitalized ACSC [6-12]. Such studies find that 
potential avoidable hospitalizations vary by socioeconomic and insurance status. Middle and lower 
classes are less likely to receive preventive services, more likely to experience delays in health care, and 
less likely to have a regular source of care. The availability of health insurance is another factor that can 
affect rates of avoidable hospitalizations [Kestner et al, 2001, Dafny and Gruber, 2005, Bermudez and 
Baker, 2005 ]. Thus, Kaester et al, 2001 and Dafny and Gruber, 2005, estimate the impact of Medicaid 
eligibility expansions on child hospitalizations. While Kaester et al, 2001 find that Medicaid eligibility 
expansions improves moderately the health of low-income children and reduce hospitalizations, Dafny 
and Gruber, 2005, show that number of hospitalizations increase, but has a much smaller increase in 
avoidable hospitalizations. Aizer, 2007 estimates the impact of Medicaid take up rather than insurance 
eligibility expansion. She estimates the impact of early Medical	   take	  up	  on	  access to primary care and 
avoidable hospitalizations, finding that a 15% increase in Medicaid enrolment would lead to a 2.7% 
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decline in avoidable hospitalizations. Little is known, however, on the impact of insurance cost-sharing 
(through coinsurance or deductibles) on hospitalizations for ACSC (also known as HCSC). 
In this paper, we study the effect of ambulatory and hospital coinsurance rates on HACSC among 
individuals with private insurance in Chile. During the last decade, Chile´s private health sector has 
experienced a dramatic increase in its hospitalization rates, growing at four times the rate of ambulatory 
visits (see graph 1). Such evolution has raised concern among policy makers, interested in promoting 
more preventive services, and a major use of ambulatory care. The growth on the prevalence of chronic 
diseases has also set up the alarm. A burden disease study made in 2007 shows that 84% of the total 
diseases in the country were non-communicable diseases (Universidad Católica de Chile, 2008). The 
2003 National Health Survey showed that only a small fraction of those affected by a chronic disease had 
their condition under control (Bitrán et al, 2010). In this context, coinsurance can be a valuable tool for 
dealing with cost escalating problems in the health system while, at the same time, promoting more 
ambulatory visits and preventive services and less HCSC.  
 
Graph 1 : Evolution of Ambulatory versus Hospital visits in the Chilean Private Sector 
 
 
Cost sharing is a common feature of insurance contracts.  It is useful to reduce patient moral hazard, 
and, therefore, overconsumption of medical care. By raising coinsurance rates, insurers can reduce 
unnecessary care and control costs. However, high coinsurance rates may also produce losses due to 
reduced financial risk protection. The search for an optimal coinsurance rate that balances this trade-off 
has been broadly study both theoretically and empirically [Arrow, 1976, Newhouse, 2006, Ellis and 
Manning, 2007, Pauly and Blavin, 2008]. We analyze cost sharing in the context of an inter-temporal 
relationship between primary care visits and avoidable hospitalizations. Such relationship presents an 
additional feature that increases the losses of an un-optimally high coinsurance rate: a high ambulatory 
coinsurance rate could reduce consumption of effective care, and, as a result, leading to a potential future 
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increase of HACSC. What is the optimal coinsurance that would allow to reduce the HACSC? What are 
the effects of different coinsurance levels on hospital and ambulatory visits for ACSC? We respond to 
these questions by means of a structural model that describes the inter-temporal correlation between 
ambulatory visits and HACSC. We use a large administrative dataset of private insurance claims in Chile 
so as to examine the effects of ambulatory and hospital coinsurance rates on both, ambulatory visits and 
HACSC. Since HACSC are avoidable through timely outpatient treatment, policy makers must assure that 
the coinsurance for hospital and ambulatory care promotes adequate primary care coverage. 
 
	  
2. The Data  
	  
Data was provided by the health regulator, the Superintendencia de Salud, which validates and 
consolidates information provided on quarterly basis2 by all the private insurers (ISAPREs or 
Instituciones de Salud Provisional) operating in Chile. Health Insurance in Chile is dual, i.e. employed 
individuals must purchase insurance for a minimum of 7% of their taxable income up to a threshold, in 
order to enroll in the public insurer (Public Health Fund, PHF) or purchase a health plan from a private 
insurer (ISAPRE). A total of 2.8 million individuals, or 16.8% of the population, were covered by a 
contract in one of the 14 ISAPREs that operated in the market by the end of 2007. Our data cover the 
period from January the 1st to December 31st 2007. 
Information provided by the ISAPRES includes characteristics of plan holders, as well as all the 
beneficiaries, including sex, age, income, and earnings. We also have extensive information on all claims 
made by these individuals, including ambulatory visits, recording diagnosis using the International 
Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems, Tenth Revision (ICD-10), codes for 
hospitalizations, and plan characteristics including coinsurance rates and caps. A health plan from 
ISAPRES typically specifies copayment rates for both outpatient and hospital services, together with caps 
on coverage by unit of service.  Few health plans do not include this cap. For instance, an insurance plan 
may have a 30% coinsurance for GP visits, up to a cap of 40 dollars, after which the individual pays the 
full marginal cost. An insurance contract, therefore, specifies two sets of parameters that define coverage: 
a set of coinsurance parameters for outpatient and hospital services, and a set of cap parameters, one for 
each service. Some plans may include the option of having a preferred health provider, in which case the 
coverage and cap parameters would be more generous for this provider. 
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Data collected for 2007 includes a total of 3,004,102 observations on the insured and their 
beneficiaries. We excluded newborns and a people age 60 or more. As a result, the sample was reduced to 
a total of 2,884,819 individuals. For each individual, we constructed indicators for ambulatory visits and 
subsequent hospital visits within a 30 days window. To check the robustness of the results, we also 
considered 60 and 90 days. We classified hospitalizations as ACSC using ICD-10 codes, and following 
the definitions of Alfradique et al. (2009). The list of ACSC included are reported in the appendix.  
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics by age group of all variables used in the study.  
	  
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics by age group 
 
 
                       Age group 
 
1 to 14  
years old 
15 to 60  
years old 
Ambulatory visits (fraction) 0.767 0.688 
 
(0.423) (0.463) 
Hospitalizations for ACSC 
(fraction) 0.001 0.001 
 
(0.034) (0.027) 
Coinsurance (ambulatory)% 28.414 28.832 
 
(17.934) (19.963) 
Coinsurance (hospitalization)% 14.923 16.591 
 
(22.712) (25.855) 
Age (in years) 7.195 35.472 
 
(3.65) (13.365) 
Gender (female=1) 1.511 1.527 
 
(0.5) (0.499) 
Income (in thousands of Chilean 
pesos) 993.72 933.628 
 
(405.576) (436.872) 
Sample size (individuals) 637,448 2,191,719 
Averages and standard errors (in parenthesis). It only considers hospitalizations for 
ACSC that occurred after the first 30 days of any ambulatory visit. 
 
 
Coinsurance is, in average, higher for ambulatory visits than for hospital visits according to age 
group. While the ambulatory coinsurance accounts for 28% of the total expenditures in health made by 
both groups of age, hospital coinsurance accounts for 14% and 16 % for children, and adults respectively.   
The incidence of hospitalizations for ACSC is not high (compare to other countries in the region), but yet 
accounts for 10 hospitalizations for every 10,000 insured individuals. Finally, the fraction of ambulatory 
visits for children and adults are 0.767 and 0.68 respectively, in spite the fact that ambulatory coinsurance 
is higher than hospital coinsurance. 
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3. The empirical strategy 
 
Since the main goal of this study is to assess the impact of coinsurance on HACSC, a simply 
estimation strategy is to model the probability of being hospitalized as a function of coinsurance and 
ambulatory visits, as shown in equation 1. Considering two periods, the probability that patient i is 
hospitalized for an ACSC in period 1 depends on the hospital coinsurance rate in patient i’s plan (!!!), a 
variable indicating if patient i had a ambulatory visit in the past (period 0), and an a contemporaneous 
error term. We expect that for ACSC, a patient who had an ambulatory visit would have a lower 
probability of being hospitalized (! < 0). However, if patient’s health status is not controlled, a 
estimation strategy such as the one in equation 1 could get biased estimates. First, health status may drive 
both, ambulatory and hospital visits, and, therefore, if health status is not fully controlled, it would bias 
the estimate of !. Second, the insurance plan selection, and consequently the observed coinsurance rate, 
could also depend on health status if individuals are free to choose among plans or if insurance companies 
select customers on the basis of health conditions. In this case, if health status is not fully controlled it 
would bias the estimate of !!. 
 Pr h!" = 1 = γ!c!! + θa!" + ε!!     (1) 
 
Although we control for patient’s characteristics, a significant component of patient’s health status 
remains unobservable, thus, creating potential omitted variable bias. To overcome the problem of 
simultaneous dependency between ambulatory and hospital visits (endogeneity), we consider a model of 
two periods where individuals decide to visit an ambulatory setting in the first period and a hospital 
setting in the second period. The patient’s decision is based on coinsurance for ambulatory and hospital 
visits, and also on health status in each period. Health status evolves stochastically between period 0 and 
period 1, and we assume that having an ambulatory visit can affect future health status. This is easily 
justifiable, since, we focus on ambulatory care-sensitive conditions, which are those that can improve 
health and avoid future hospitalizations. The dynamic of health status is as follows: 
 s!" = s!" + θa!" + µμ!"      (2) 
 
Where !!! is the (unobserved) health status of individual i in period 1, !!! is a binary variable that 
indicates if individual i visited an ambulatory setting in period 0, and !!! is an independent error term. 
 
6	  
	  
We model a system of two equations, one for ambulatory visits and the second for hospital visits. For 
identification purpose we make the reasonable assumption that hospital visits depends only on hospital 
coinsurance, while ambulatory visits depend on both, ambulatory and hospital coinsurances. We justify 
this because patients may potentially avoid ambulatory care if hospital visits are relatively cheap.  The 
system of simultaneous equations is represented by equations (3-4). 
    
 Pr !!! = 1 = !!!!!! + !!"!!! + !!!! + !!!!! + !!!!     (3) 
 Pr ℎ!! = 1 =                                   !!"!!! + !!!! + !!!!! + !!!!     (4) 
 
Where ℎ!! is binary variable that indicates that individual i visits the hospital for chronic ACSC in 
period 1. Coinsurance for ambulatory visits (!!!) and hospital visits (!!!) are assumed to be time 
independent, i.e. defined when the individual selected an insurance plan.  !! are patient’s observable 
characteristics such as age, gender, income, etc. The error terms are independently distributed. 
 
Replacing  (2) in (4), we can re-write the simultaneous equation model (3-4) as: 
 Pr !!! = 1 =                                 !!!!!! + !!"!!! + !!!! + !!!!      (5)  Pr ℎ!! = 1 = !!!!! +                                   !!"!!! + !!!! + !!!!     (6) 
 
Where ! ≡ !!!,   !!!! ≡ !!!!! + !!!! , and  !!!! ≡ !!!!! + !!!!! + !!!!  
 
Although this system corrects for the simultaneity of ambulatory and hospital visits, coinsurance rates 
could still be correlated with error terms in equations (5-6). If insurance selection is endogenous and 
driven by unobserved health status, the impact of coinsurance on ambulatory and hospital visits would be 
biased. In the selection of an insurance plan, two factors may make insurance choice dependable of health 
status. First, patients may select plans based on their health status (adverse selection). In that case, sickly 
patients may choose better plans, with lower coinsurances as more care visits are expected. This effect 
will downward bias the effect of coinsurances on hospital and ambulatory visits. However, a second 
possibility is that insurance companies can discriminate based on health status (cream skimming). In that 
case the insurance pool will be formed by healthy patients, which use less care visits. In Chile there is 
evidence of cream skimming by ISAPRES [Sapelli, 2004]. This effect will upward bias the effect of 
coinsurance on hospital and ambulatory visits. To overcome this problem, we follow a second step and 
include two instruments that are correlated to the plan’s generosity (and therefore correlated to 
coinsurance rates) but uncorrelated to health status. In particular, the first instrument is popularity of the 
plan measured as the number of members in a given plan. To the extent that individual may select plans 
that are specific to their health status, popular plans are most likely to be attractive because of 
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characteristics that are common to a large number of members rather than to individual specific benefits. 
We expect plan’s popularity to be uncorrelated with individual’s health status. The second instrument is 
the minimum legal insurance premium. By law, Chileans in the ISAPRE system has to purchase 
insurance whose minimum premium is equivalent to 7% of personal income up to a maximum limit of 60 
UF (legal unit of account adjusted by inflation commonly used in Chile). However, Chileans are free to 
pay higher premiums in order to obtain more generous plans. We expect the minimum legal insurance 
premium to be uncorrelated with individual’s health status because it is set by law. Although one may 
argue that income is associated with health status, we consider that in our sample that argument is weak 
since individuals with private insurance in Chile are usually from medium to high socioeconomic status 
and similar age (younger than those affiliated to the public insurance).   
Notice that although system (5-6) is a recursive system of equations, identification cannot rest on 
recursivity because both error terms are dependent (through the unobserved health status). For simplicity, 
we assume a linear probability model, which produce a linear system of equations. Because the system is 
just identified, we estimate the system by 2SLS corrected by heteroskedasticity via GMM estimation 
[Greene, 2008].  
	  
4. Results 
Table 2 presents results for hospitalizations by group age. We present those results corresponding to 
the two equations of interest, hospital visits and ambulatory visits.  The equation of hospital visits 
estimates the probability of having a hospital visit. The first main result from this equation confirms the 
basic hypothesis underneath ACSC studies: ambulatory visits tend to reduce the probability of future 
hospitalizations. In particular, the probability of having a HACSC after having had one or more 
ambulatory visits, decreases by 0.54% and 0.68% for both, children and adults. The hospital equation 
offers a second result: increasing the hospital coinsurance does not reduce the probability of having more 
hospital visits. This is only statistically significant for adults, and the effect is very small.  
The ambulatory visits equation estimates the probability of having ambulatory visits. This equation 
offers two main results. On the one hand, if the ambulatory coinsurance increases, the probability of 
having an ambulatory visit decreases in 1.14%. for children, and 0.69% for adults.  On the other hand, if 
hospital coinsurance augments, ambulatory visits will increase, showing a substitutive relationship 
between ambulatory and hospital visits.  
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Table 2. Results for ambulatory and hospital visits 
 
                       Age group 
 
1 to 14  
years old 
15 to 60  
years old 
Ambulatory visits 
  Intercept 1.0453** 1.0033** 
 
(0.0083) (0.0045) 
Ambulatory coinsurance -0.0114** -0.0091** 
 
(0.0004) (0.0002) 
Hospital coinsurance 0.0063** -0.0002 
 
(0.0004) (0.0002) 
Age -0.0161** 0.0021** 
 
(0.0002) (0.0000) 
Gender (male) -0.0016 -0.1173** 
 
(0.0011) (0.0007) 
Income 0.0001** 0.0000** 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) 
Hospital visits 
  Intercept 0.0046** 0.0054** 
 
(0.0014) (0.0009) 
Ambulatory visit (1 or more) -0.0054** -0.0068** 
 
(0.0018) (0.0010) 
Hospital coinsurance 0.0000 0.0000** 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) 
Age -0.0002** 0.0000** 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) 
Gender (male) 0.0001 -0.0010** 
 
(0.0001) (0.0001) 
Income 0.0000** 0.0000** 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) 
Simultaneous equation linear model estimated by 2SLS. Ambulatory and Hospital visits are 
binary variables. The heteroscedasticity produced by the linear probabilities are adjusted 
using GMM.  
* Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, *** Significant at 10%. Robust standard errors in 
parenthesis.	  
	  
 
Since increasing ambulatory visits reduce the probability of future hospitalizations, and at the 
same time, increasing ambulatory coinsurance, decreases ambulatory visits, results seem to indicate the 
need to reduce the ambulatory coinsurance as a way to reduce hospitalizations.  In graphs 2 and 3 we 
calculate what would be the optimal ambulatory coinsurance for children and adults.  These graphs 
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present the different probabilities of having an ambulatory visit (blue line) or a hospital visit (red line) 
under various scenarios with different ambulatory coinsurances.  
 
Graph 2. Estimation of the Optimal Ambulatory Coinsurance for Children 
	  
	  
	  
ISAPRES established an ambulatory coinsurance of 28% in 2007, as shown in table 1. Our 
estimations show that for a given hospital coinsurance (fixed at 15%, which was the hospital coinsurance 
determined by ISAPRES in 2007), the optimal ambulatory coinsurance should be established at 18% for 
children and 19% for adults in order to reduce subsequent hospitalizations. 
 
Graph 3: Estimation of Optimal Ambulatory Coinsurance for Adults 
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5. Discussion 
 
In this paper, we have used a large administrative dataset of private insurance claims in Chile to 
estimate, through a structural model, the effects of ambulatory and hospital coinsurance rates on both, 
ambulatory visits and HACSC. We find evidence supporting that ambulatory visits avoid hospitalizations. 
We also find that increasing ambulatory coinsurance decreases the probability of having ambulatory 
visits. These two findings imply that the ambulatory coinsurance should be decreased substantially in 
order to reduce the high rate of hospitalizations found in the private sector of Chile. 
How much should ambulatory coinsurance be diminished so as to reduce hospitalizations for ACSC 
to zero? We show that for a hospital coinsurance of 15%, the optimal ambulatory coinsurance should be 
18% for children and 19% for children, a figure substantially lower than the ambulatory coinsurance in 
2007 (28%). On the other hand, altering hospital coinsurance does not seem to have a significant effect on 
hospitalizations. We believe this result is justified because hospitalizations are less sensitive to price 
changes mainly due to two factors: (1) health condition of patients who decide to search for healthcare at 
the hospital is generally worse than those who search for ambulatory care, (2) the final decision on 
hospitalizing a patient relies mostly on the doctor.  However, we also find a substitutive relationship 
between ambulatory and hospital visits. The ambulatory equation shows that a higher hospital 
coinsurance increases the probability of having more ambulatory visits. This is consistent with the 
hypothesis that ambulatory and hospital visits are correlated, and shows that the effect of a higher hospital 
coinsurance would have a stronger effect on ambulatory visits than on hospital visits.  
These results are aligned with previous findings in the health insurance and cost-sharing literature. 
Thus, Ellis, Jiang and Manning, 2011 find that optimal treatment cost shares should be lower for 
positively correlated treatment goods and goods with positive cross price effects, reaffirming previous 
findings by Besley (1988) on multiple goods.  
We do not measure the supply incentives that may exist among physicians working for ISAPRES to 
hospitalize patients. While decreasing ambulatory coinsurance seems to be a good policy, the 
Government should analyze what are the incentives behind the dramatic increase of hospitalizations in the 
private sector of Chile. We offer a demand side solution, through coinsurance, but clearly, the analysis is 
insufficient without evaluating the effects from the supply side.  
Our data on ambulatory visits is not disaggregated to disentangle what ambulatory visits are 
preventive. Future research should explore this matter, since it would be relevant to determine the effect 
of coinsurance on prevention and hospitalizations for ACSC. A recent paper by Cabral and Cullen, 2011, 
explores the effect of insurance coverage on preventive care and explains how an insurance company in 
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the US increased the marginal price of curative care while decreasing the marginal price of prevention. 
They find a cross-price effect; i.e., increases in the price of curative care can depress preventive care 
utilization. Their results are aligned with previous findings in the literature like those of the RAND health 
insurance experiments that showed that cost-sharing does not induce a selective choice between more 
effective and less effective medical care, deterring the access of both, unnecessary and necessary care 
[Manning et al, 1987, Tamblyn et al, 2001].  
Finally, we could not perform a more detail analysis, considering individual ACSC, and/or different 
groups of ACSC. Since we only have data for one year, 2007, we would compromise the statistical 
robustness of the estimation by adding more groups. Unfortunately, we could not get data for more years, 
but we expect to be able to access to new data in the future.  Such analysis would have been extremely 
interesting, especially because the AUGE law was passed in Chile in 2005. This law prioritized the health 
services related to fifty-six medical conditions, most of them chronic, promoted preventive services and 
introduce new treatment guidelines and new co-sharing rules,  among other measures. In particular, the 
AUGE law mandated coverage for a set of interventions for children and adults aimed at prevention and 
early detection of hypertension, types 1 and 2 diabetes, HIV/AIDS, cervival cancer, and other chronic 
diseases. The new law also established that insurers, both PH and ISAPRES, must reimburse an explicit 
amount for each guaranteed health intervention, so that the beneficiary´s out of pocket spending will not 
exceed a predefined share of household income. In addition, when seeking care for a medical problem 
under the AUGE reforms, both PH and ISAPRES beneficiaries could make two care choices: select a 
closed mode, choosing providers from AUGE network and paying a lower or no copayment, or they can 
obtain care outside of AUGE through a free choice mode, paying higher copayments but receiving faster, 
higher-quality care; better amenities; and continued access to a personal doctor (Bitrán et al, 2010).  
AUGE law also promoted the systematic application of treatment guidelines in order to lower the 
incidence of complications, and therefore, hospitalizations from inadequate disease management. Having 
the specific information for certain ACSC would be essential to understand the new cost-sharing rules and 
its effects on the particular ACSCs. 
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Appendix 
 
List and Definition of Ambulatory Care Sensitive Conditions (ACSC)  
Group Diagnostic ICD-10 (Primary condition only) 
1 
Vaccine-preventable 
G00.0,A17.0,A33,A34,A35,A36,A37,A95,B16, 
B05,B06,B26,A19 
2 No vaccine-preventable 
(rheumatic fever, syphilis, 
tuberculosis) 
A17.1,A17.2,A17.3,A17.4,A17.5,A17.6,A17.7, 
A17.8,A17.9,A15,A16,A18,I00,I01,I02,A51, 
A52,A53,B50,B51,B52,B53,B54, B77 
3 Dehydration and gastroenteritis E86,A00,A01,A01,A03,A04,A05, A06,A07,A08,A09 
4 Iron deficiency anemia D50 
5 
Nutritional deficiencies 
E40,E41,E42,E43,E44,E45,E46, 
E50,E51,E52,E53,E54,E55,E56, 
E57,E58,E59,E60,E61,E62,E63, E64 
6 Ear, nose and throat infections H66,J00,J01,J02,J03,J06,J31 
7 Bacterial pneumonia J15.3,J15.4,J15.8,J15.9,J18.1,J13,J14 
8 Asthma J45,J46 
9 Chronic obstructive pulmonary 
disease J20,J21,J40,J41,J42,J43,J44, J47 
10 Hypertension I10,I11 
11 Angina pectoris I20 
12 Congestive heart failure I50,J81 
13 Cerebrovascular disease I63,I64,I65,I66,I67,I69,G45, G46 
14 Diabetes E10,E11,E12,E13,E14 
15 Convulsions and epilepsy G40,G41 
16 Pyelonephritis N39.0,N10,N11,N12,N30,N34 
17 Skin and subcutaneous tissue 
infection A46,L01,L02,L03,L04,L08 
18 Pelvic inflammatory disease N70,N71,N72,N73,N75,N76 
19 Perforated/bleeding ulcer K92.0,K92.1,K92.2,K25,K26,K27,K28 
20 Prenatal and natal complications P35.0,O23,A50 
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